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emand for college-graduate workers was strong during the 1980s
I (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1989; Katz and Murphy 1990;
Kosters 1989; Freeman 1991). Their relative wage rose, and the
share of 18- to 24-year-olds attending college rose in response. Have the
demand and technology shocks that produced this result now run their
course? Is the supply response large enough to stop or reverse the 1980s
escalation of the relative wages of college graduates?
Read superficially, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projections
appear to suggest that the answer to these questions is ’%es." In the most
recent BLS report, the growing supply of college graduates was projected
to outstrip growth in demand by 330,000 am~ually (Shelley 1994). An
even larger gap between supply and demand had been projected in 1992
(Shelley 1992). Looking at earlier projections, some in the press even
reported that the college graduate labor market was about to go bust. New
York Times reporter Louis Uchitelle, for example, led off an article titled
"Surplus of College Graduates Dims Job Outlook for Others" with the
following:
Hundreds of thousands of jobs, once performed creditably without a college
degree, are today going to college graduates as employers take advantage of
an oversupply .... At roughly 25 percent of the work force--higher than in
any other industrial nation--college graduates outstrip the demand for their
skills, the Labor Department reports (June 18, 1990, p. 1).
Most economists, however, do not believe a surplus of college
graduates and other skilled workers exists now or is likely to develop
anytime soon. The Secretary of Labor and the Chief Economist’s office
within the U.S. Department of Labor apparently give little credence to the
BLS projections of a college graduate surplus. Skills shortages are a
common theme of Secretary Robert Reich’s speeches and of policy
initiatives of the department.
Who is right? Is a bust of the college graduate labor market on thehorizon? In fact, a closer reading of the latest BLS
projections suggests that it is not. The future is pre-
dicted to be much like the past. Since the recent past
has been characterized by low unemployment and
rising relative wages for college graduates, the BLS
data can also be interpreted as predicting more of the
same.
Past BLS projections have not been particularly
successful in predicting changes in the market for
college graduates. The BLS projected a strong market
for college graduates in 1970, just prior to the bust of
the 1970s. The BLS projected a weak market in 1980,
just prior to the 1980s boom. Moreover, the task of
projecting the number of jobs "requiring a college
degree" into the future is essentially impossible. The
methods used to make the projections are not well
adapted to the task. BLS projections published in 1981,
1983, and 1985 underestimated the gro~vth of mana-
gerial and professional jobs and overestimated the
growth of lower-skill jobs. The methods used to
project occupational employment inevitably miss an
hnportant portion of the rise in skills that is under way
in our economy.
Findings about skill differentials
suggest that we should raise high-
school standards, increase student
financial aid, make tuition tax-
deductible, and stop increasing
tuition at public colleges.
An alternate methodology for projecting occupa-
tional employment is available. Regressions predict-
ing occupational employment shares with a trend,
unemployment, the trade deficit, and the share of
workers using personal computers did a better job
projecting the early 1990s than the BLS. Both methods,
however, missed predicting the slowdowns in the
growth of clerical, technical, and craft jobs.
The updated model projects that professional,
technical, and managerial jobs will account for 60
percent of job growth between 1990 and 2005. Skill
differentials between college-level jobs and other jobs
continue to expand, even in the most recent data. And
because the college-age population cohort is small, the
increase in the share of the cohort attending school
has not produced a substantial increase in the ratio of
new BAs to total employment. Rates of college com-
pletion are not high enough to flood the college
graduate market, and U.S. youth are not overeducated
relative to those of other nations, as has been claimed.
In fact, young Europeans and East Asians spend more
years in school than young Americans.
These findings have important policy implica-
tions. They suggest that we should raise high school
standards, increase student financial aid, make tuition
tax-deductible, and stop increasing tuition at public
colleges.
What Do the 1994 BLS Projections
of Supply and Demand for
Graduates Really Imply?
Let us begin by examining the projections of
supply and demand made by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics in 1992 and 1994. The 1992 report states that
"estimates of available entrants to the college graduate
labor force (supply) will average... 406,000 more than
demand" (Shelley 1992, p. 16). The 1994 report pre-
dicts that "nearly 25 percent of new entrants are
expected to settle for jobs that do not require a college
degree" (Shelley 1994, p. 9). Both sound quite negative
about the future demand for college graduates. Table
1 presents the numbers. In 1992, BLS projected a
significant deterioration of the supply-demand bal-
ance during the 1990s. The annual increase in the
number of "underemployed" graduates was projected
to be equal to 31 percent of the annual flow of BAs into
the labor force (both immigrants and new graduates)
during the period. The share of underemployed col-
lege graduates was projected to increase from 19.9
percent in 1990 to 25.9 percent in 2000.
However, when later projections were made, pre-
dictions of employment growth in professional jobs
~vere revised upward, from the 340,500 per year of the
1991 projections to 477,000 per year in the 1993 pro-
jections and to 461,000 in the 1995 projections (Silvestri
and Lukasiewicz 1991; Silvestri 1993; BLS 1996). This
has improved BLS’s projected outlook for college
graduates. Consequently, in the most recent report,
the gap between supply and delnand is expected to
grow only slightly, from 22 percent of the gross
increase in the supply of BAs to 24 percent after 1992.
The BLS also projects that the growth of the "under-
employment" share will accelerate somewhat after
1992.
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College Graduates Entering the Labor Force and College-
Level lob Openings, Past and Projected to 2005
Annual Averages, in Thousands
1992 Projections    1994 Projections
Are the BLS Estimates of
Jobs "’Requiring" a




1984-    1990-    1984-    1992-
1990     2005     1992     2005
Supply coming from:
New graduates (National Center for
Educational Statistics projections) 974 1106 1000 1180
Other entrants (immigration) 214 214 200 200
Increase in supply of BAs in labor
force 1188 1320 1200 1380
Demand coming from:
Growth of occupations normally
"requiring" a BA 459 311 593 562
Growth due to upgrading 308 291 157 168
Replacement demand--due to
retirements 197 312 190 320
Increase in college-level jobs held
by BAs 964 914 940 1050
Yearly increase in graduates not in
college-level jobs 224 406 260 330
Ratio of this supply-demand gap to
growth of BAs in labor force 18.9% 30.8% 21.7% 23.9%
Annual change in the share of BAs
underemployed .16% .61% .35% .50%
These projections can be interpreted in two very
different ways. Many reporters have interpreted them
as implying tliat tlie market for college graduates is
about to deteriorate. This interpretation comes from
focusing on projected gaps between demand and
supply in the future. Focusing instead on how the
future is expected to differ from the recent past, one
arrives at a different conclusion. The 1994 report
projects that the supply-demand balance for college
graduate workers for the 1992-2005 period will be
rather similar to the conditions that prevailed dur-
ing the previous eight years. Since unemployment
rates of college graduates remained low and relative
wage rates grew substantially from 1984 to 1992,
the BLS projections really predict a continuation of
the strong labor market for college graduates that
characterized the 1980s. They also point out, quite
correctly, tliat a strong market for college graduates
does not imply that all college graduates will liave
professional, technical, managerial, or sales represen-
tative jobs.
The BLS assesses the current
demand-supply balance for college
graduates by defining a set of jobs
that "require" a college degree and
then counting up the number of
college graduates who do not have
one of these jobs. The workers be-
ing categorized are not asked
whether they believe a college de-
gree is required or useful in their
job. The classification is based on
the match between reported educa-
tion and reported occupation.
Workers with fewer than 16 years
of schooling are automatically
com~ted as having jobs that do not
require a college degree. Workers
with 16 or more years of schooling
are classified as "tmderemployed"
when the reported occupation ap-
pears not to "require" a college
degree.
This classification of occupa-
tions is inherently arbitrary and
idiosyncratic to the analyst. When Sargent and Pflee-
ger (1990) did the analysis, the BLS concluded there
were 18.1 million college-level jobs in 1988. When
Hecker (1992) reestimated the number two years later,
he found 21.8 million college-level jobs (a 20 percent
increase). Yet the validity of the whole effort to mea-
sure "underemployment" depends on this classifica-
tion being done correctly in every detail, not ol~ly for
the present but also for up to 15 years in the future.
This is essentially impossible.
First, the occupational coding system used by the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Census is
not reliable and comprehensive enougli to allow accu-
rate measurement of a concept like "underemploy-
ment." Census Bureau studies have found that be-
tween 18.3 and 27.3 percent of the individuals
recorded as professionals, technicians, or managers in
one interview are recorded in a less skilled occupation
in a subsequent interview four to seven months later
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972).
Substantial errors also occur in measuring educa-
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spondents recorded as having more than 16 years of
schooling in one interview are recorded as having
fewer than 16 years of schooling in a later interview. If
errors in reporting occupation and schooling are un-
correlated with each other, measurement error raises
the esthnated "underemployment" share by as much
as 12 to 18 percentage points.1
Consequently, reporth~g and coding errors are
responsible for many of the apparent mismatches
bet~veen an individual’s occupation and his or her
education. Ho~v else can one explain the 9.6 percent of
college teachers and the 5.4 to 6.5 percent of lawyers,
physicians, and secondary school teachers who claim
not to have completed 16 years of schooling (BLS 1990,
Table F-3)? The unreliability of individual measures of
occupation and education means that counts of mis-
matches between schooling and occupation derived
from micro CPS data have little validity. True mis-
matches between education and occupation are a lot
less common than these statistics suggest.
The second problem is the lack of symmetry in
the handling of possible mismatches between educa-
tional qualifications and occupation. Large numbers of
workers without college degrees say they occupy jobs
that most people would agree "require" at least a
four-year degree. In 1988, 44,000 la~vyers, 42,000 social
scientists, 46,000 natural scientists, 33,000 physicians,
61,000 college teachers, 143,000 elementary and sec-
ondary school teachers, and 363,000 engineers said
they had not completed four or more years of college
(BLS 1990, Table F-3). The BLS does not classify these
individuals as "undereducated." By ruling out the
possibility of undereducation, the conceptual frame-
work makes inevitable a conclusion that there are too
many college graduates.
The third problem is the great heterogeneity of
the college graduate category. Ten percent of college
graduates cannot write a brief letter explaining an
error made on a credit card bill or determine the
discount frown an oil bill for early payment (National
~ Let us make the standard assumption that measurement error
is random (that is, uncorrelated over time and uncorrelated across
questions). Then, 18.3 to 27.3 percent of respondents reporting a
PTM occupation in one interview reporting a non-PTM occupation
in another interview implies that 0.8526 to 0.9039 of the individuals
who are truly in a PTM occupation report themselves h~ a PTM
occupation {(1 - .273).5 = .8526}. The esthnated proportion of true
college graduates who report haviug less than a college degree is
0.9539 to 0.9721 {(1 - .09)~= .9539}. Thus, the estimated proportion
of true college graduates with PTiVl jobs who underreport either
their occupation or schooling ranges between 0.1213 and 0.1867
{.1867 = (1 - .8526 * .9539)}.
Table 2
Occupations of College Graduates by
Degree of Prose Literacy









1    2 3 4
11.2 7.3 7.5 4.6
5 Total
2.3 5.5
46 56 64 75 83 71
1.6 7.8 30 42 16.8 100
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 1995a, pp. 38,
40, 66). As one can see h~ Table 2, these graduates are
less likely to have professional, technical, or manage-
rial jobs and much more likely to have service or
laborer jobs (NCES 1995a, p. 95).
More than 40 percent of young adults with asso-
ciate or bachelor’s degrees cannot calculate change
from a menu. Seventeen percent of young college
graduates read at a level below the typical eleventh-
grader (Kitsch and Jungeblut 1986). How can someone
with high-school or lower reading and math levels
be considered "underemployed" or "overeducated"
in a secretarial, carpentry, or retail sales job? For such
individuals, the problem is "undereducation," not
"underemployment."~
The fourth problem is that for most occupations,
the question "Does it require a college degree?" does
not have a "yes" or "no" answer. It is a matter of
degree. Some employers structure their management
jobs in ways that make the skills normally developed
in college absolutely essential; at other employers such
skills are very helpful, and at still others the skills are
of little advantage. The magnitude of the college
graduate productivity advantage also depends on the
quality of the alternative labor supply. If the compe-
tence of those who ended their schoolbag with high
school deteriorates, as it did during the 1970s (Bishop
1991), the demand for college graduates will increase.
The correct answer to the question of ~vhether a
x Robst’s (1995) analysis of PSID data indicates that the prestige
ranking of the college one attends also has large effects on the
probability of being "underemployed." Those who attended col-
leges in the bottom fifth of the prestige ranking had twice the
likelihood of being counted as "tmderemployed" of those who
attended colleges in the top quartile.
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college degree is required is "It depends." It depends
on circumstances that analysts and researchers have
little knowledge of and no ability to forecast a decade
ahead.
The BLS projection exercise apparently assumes
that occupations have specific educational or basic
skill "requirements." This job requirements view of
the world is illustrated in Figure 1. Job A requires a
basic skill level of at least M1 while job B requires basic
skills at or above M2. Exceeding these skill thresholds,
however, very quickly yields no further increases in
productivity. Once the threshold is reached, dhninish-
ing returns set in with a vengeance. People working in
job A who have an M2 skill level are classified as
"underemployed." Is this ho~v basic skills influence
job performance? Let us test the job requirements
hypothesis.
The job requirements view predicts that everyone
in job A will have at least the M~ skill level, and that
as a result of diminishing returns, the steep produc-
tivity increase near the M1 skill level quickly becomes
a very gentle slope as the individual’s skill increases.
In other words, the relationship between test scores
and job performance should have a convex shape (a
large negative second derivative). The job require-
ments view also implies that the impact of basic skills
tests on job performance should diminish as schooling
increases.
Data collected by the U.S. Department of Labor’s
Employment Service to validate the General Aptitude
Test Battery were used to test these hypotheses. This
data set contains data on job performance, the ~zine
GATB "aptitudes," and background data on 36,614
individuals in 159 different occupations. Professional,
managerial, and high-level sales occupations were not
studied but the sample is quite representative of the
71.1 million workers in the rest of the occupational
distribution. It ranges from drafters and laboratory
testers to hotel clerks and knitting-machine operators.
A total of 3,052 employers participated. (See Box 1,
"Description of the Job Performance Study," below.)
The results are presented in Figure 2 and Table 3.B
3 Selection effects generate a negative bias in coefficients on
years of schooling. In a selected sample like accepted job applicants
or job incumbents, one cannot argue that these omitted unobserv-
able variables are uncorrelated with the included variables that
were used to make initial hh’ing decisions and, therefore, that
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A Test of the Job Requirements Model~
General Mean of
General Academic GAA When Psychomotor R2/ General Psycho-
Academic Ability Schooling Psychomotor Ability Years of Number of Academic motor
Ability Squared over 12 Years Ability Squared Schooling Observations Ability Ability
All Workers .227*** -.0096 .057*** .122*** -.017*** -.017*** .1329 .00 .00
(.009) (.007) (.014) (.007) (.005) (.004) 31,399
Occupational Groups
Technicians    .265 .... .033      .030        .116 .... .018       .030*      .1188       .49      .19
(.043) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.017) (.016) 2,384
High-Skill .223*** .012 .033 .112*** .003 .022 .1611 .53 .42
Clerical (.037) (.028) (.046) (.030) (.017) (.017) 2,570
Low-Skill .323"** .013 .024 .115 .... .019 -.010 .1354 .21 .18
Clerical (.028) (.021) (.039) (.020) (.015) (.012) 4,122
Plant .181"** -.030 .062 .135"** -.032 .003 .2063 .30 -.16
Operators (.066) (.043) (.098) (.048) (.027) (.031) 651
Craft Workers .236 .....007 .018 .098"** -.010 -.011 .1481 .12 -.11
(.016) (.012) (.026) (.013) (.008) (.007) 10,061
Operatives     .177*** -.002 .050 .168 .... .019* -.032*** .1433 -.38 -.03
(.017) (.013) (.036) (.014) (.010) (.008) 8,167
Service .340"** .005 .070 .148"** -.032* -.021 .1559 -.31 -.24
Workers (.037) (.026) (.063) (.028) (.019) (.017) 1,927
SalesClerks .175" -.173"* .109 .197"** -.070" -.015 .1172 .19 .08
(.090) (.063) (.129) (.066) (.042) (.037) 416
*Probability less than .10 on a two tail test.
**Probability less than .05 on a two tail test.
***Probability less than .01 on a two tail test.
aThe other variables included in the models but not shown were age, age squared, occupational experience, occupational experience squared, plant
expedance, plant experience squared, and dummies for female, black and Hispanic. Standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficient.
Source: Analysis of GATB Revaiidation Data in the U.S. Employment Semice’s Individual Data file.
For general academic ability, the hypothesis of dimin-
ishing returns was rejected ha seven of the eight
occupation groups. The exception was sales clerks,
coefficients on included variables are tmbiased. When someone with
10 years of formal schooling is hired for a job that normally requires
12 years of schooling, there is probably a reason for that decision.
The employer saw something positive in that job applicant (maybe
the applicant received particularly strong recommendations from
previous employers) that led to the decision to make an exception to
the rule that new hires should have 12 years of schooling. The
analyst is unaware of the positive recommendations, does not
include them in the job performance model and, as a result, the
coefficient on schooling is biased toward zero. This phenomenon
also causes the estimated effects of other worker traits used to select
workers for the job such as previous relevant work experience to be
biased toward zero. Consequently, the results presented should not
be viewed as estimates of the structural effect of schooling on
worker productivity. The test score results are not similarly biased,
however, because firms using aptitude tests similar to the GATB for
selecting new hires ~vere excluded from the regression.
where the squared term on general academic ability
was sig~fificantly negative and general academic abil-
ity had a positive effect on performance only when the
test scores were no more than one-half a standard
deviation above the mean.
For psychomotor skills, however, the hypothesis
of diminishhag returns was accepted at the 10 percent
level for operatives, service workers and sales work-
ers, and for all workers combined. The second deriv-
atives are not so large, however, that the sign of the
relationship reverses within the range of actual data.
For all workers and for operatives, the derivative of
performance with respect to the psychomotor test
scores at one standard deviation above the mean of the
test is 52 to 57 percent of the derivative when test
scores are one standard deviation below the mean. For
service workers, the derivative one standard deviation
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Description of the Job Performance Study
The workers in the study were given the GATB
test battery and asked to supply information on
theh" age, education, plant experience, and total
experience. Plant experience was defined as years
working in that occupation for the current em-
ployer. Total experience was defined as years work-
ing in the occupation for all employers. The depen-
dent variable was an average of two ratings
(generally two weeks apart) supplied by the work-
er’s immediate supervisor. The Standard Descrip-
tive Rath~g Scale obtains supervisory ratings of five
aspects of job performance (quantity, quality, accu-
racy, job knowledge, and job x~ersatility) as well as
an "all-around" perforlnance rating. Firms with
only one employee in the job classification were
excluded, as were individuals whose reported work
experience was inconsistent with their age.
Because wage rates, average productivity levels,
and the standards used to rate employees vary
from plant to plant, mean differences in ratings
across establishments have no real meaning. There-
fore, normalized ratings deviations were predicted
by deviations from the job/establishment’s mean
for gender, race, Hispanic, age, age squared, plant
experience, plant experience squared, total occupa-
tional experience, total occupational experience
squared, schooling, and test composites.
Deviations of rated performance (RI]~ - Rp~) from
the mean for the establishment (Rp~) were analyzed,
where the subscript i refers to the individual and
j refers to the job and establishment combination.
The variance of the job performance distribution
was also standardized across establishments by
dividing (RIj~ - RI~) by the standard deviation
of rated performance, SDj(Ri~), calculated for that
firm. Separate models were estimated for each
major occupation. They were specified as follows:
1) Ri~ - Rp~ - /30 + !31(Vij- Tj) +/32(Tij- Vj)2
SDj(Ri~~)
q~ /33(Sij - Sj) q- /34(Xij - Xj) q- ]35(Dij - Dj) + v2
where Rij = rating standardized to have a zero






a vector of test score composites--general
academic ability and psychomotor ability.
years of schooling.
a vector of age and experience variables--
age, age squared, total occupational experi-
ence, total occupational experience
squared, plant experience and plant expe-
rience squared.
a vector of dummy variables for black,
Hispanic, and female.
Xi and Dj are the lneans of test composites,
schooling, experience variables, and race
and gender dummies for the job/establish-
ment combh~ation.
General Academic Ability was constructed by
averaging the GATB’s G and N composites. Conse-
quently, it is a weighted average of four subtests: a
timed arithmetic computation test with a weight of
0.25, an arithmetic reasoning test with a weight
of 0.41, a vocabulary test with a weight of 0.17, and
a spatial relations test with a weight of 0.17.
Squared terms and an h~teraction with schooling
greater than 12 were included in the model to test
for ceiling effects and other nonlinearities.
above the mean is 37 percent of the derivative at one
standard deviation below the mean.
These results suggest that the job requirements
model has some validity for psychomotor skills but
not for the basic academic skills that are the primary
objective of schoolbag. Both this analysis and studies
conducted by others have found that the underlying
relationship between basic academic skills and perfor-
mance in a specific job is smooth, continuous, and
close to linear (Hunter 1983).
The Record of BLS Projections of the
Demand and Supply for College Graduates
Despite the difficulties, since 1970 the BLS has
published biennial projections of the supply-demand
balance. The starting point of its projections are its
forecasts of occupational employment growth. It then
projects changes h~ the proportion of particular occu-
pations that "require a college degree," the number of
bachelor’s degrees to be awarded per year, and the
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BLS Projections of the Supply/Demand for College Graduates and Subsequent Changes in
the College Wage Pre~nium
Projected Growth in                                                           Actual Change
Underemployed College Graduates Implied Predicted in CG/HSG
Annual 10-Year % Actual lO-Year % Underemployed Change in Wage Ratio
Date Projection Average Change in Share Growth of Share College Grad CG/HSG (Percentage
Published Period (000s) Underemployed Underemployed % Share~BLS Wage Ratio Points)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1970 1968-80 8 -4.2 6.7 10.6 Rise -6.7
1972 1970-80 20 -4.3 7.3 11.3 Rise -7.6
1974 1972-85 62 -3.5 5.3 14.4 Rise + 14.2
1976 1974-85 86 -2.9 3.7 15.4 Rise +18.9
1978 1976-85 300 5.5 1.7 17.7 Decline +23.2
1980 1978-90 275 3.5 2.2 17.3 Decline +26.5
1982 1980-90 300 4.1 1.3 18.6 Decline +23.6
1984 1982-95 300 4.2 .3 19.7 Decline
1986 1984-95 200 1.2 19.1 Small Decline
1988 1986-2000 100 -2.3 19.4 Small Rise
1990 1988-2000 150 -.5 19.5 Stable
1992 1990-2005 406 6,1 19.9 Big Decline
1994 1992-2005 330 5.0 20.0 Decline
Source: The record of past BLS forecasts of the supply-demand balance is taken from an unpublished BLS memorandum and from Shelley (1992; 1994).
Columns 4 and 5 are the projected and actual growth over the succeeding 10-year period of the share of college graduates who are "underemployed." The
BLS estimates of the share of college graduates underemployed given in column 6 are taken from Hecker (1992). They are for the year that begins the
projection period. For occupations outside the professional, technical, managerial, and sales representative category, worker reports of qualifying training
requirements from the 1983 survey of training received were used to estimate the proportion of jobs in the occupation that required a college degree. The
data on subsequent changes in the ratio of college and high school wages for workers with one to five years of experience are taken from Katz and Murphy
(1990).
annual rates of flow into and out of jobs by workers
with a college degree. Comparisons are then made
between the projected number of job openings "re-
quiring a college degree" and the projected flow of
college graduates seeking work, producing estimates
of the number of "underemployed" college graduates.
Column 3 of Table 4 presents BLS’s projection of the
annual increase in the number of "underemployed"
college graduates during the projection period. Col-
umn 4 presents the projected 10-year change in the
share of college graduates who are "underemployed."
Quite clearly the BLS effort to project the supply-
demand balance for college graduates has been a
failure. Compare the predicted changes in the share of
college graduates underemployed (Column 4) to the
actual changes (Column 5). At the beginning of the
1970s, BLS projected a decline in the share of college
graduates who were underemployed during the sub-
sequent decade. Instead, the share underemployed
grew substantially. Changes in the relative wage of
young college graduates provide an additional ex post
criterion for evaluating the accuracy of BLS’s projec-
tions of supply-demand balance (Columns 7 and 8). If
the projection had been correct, the relative wage of
college graduates should have also risen during the
period. Instead, the college premium fell 6.7 to 7.6
percentage points by 1980 (Column 8).
At the end of the 1970s, BLS was projecting large
surpluses of college graduates during the 1980s. Ac-
cording to the projection made in 1978, the surplus of
college graduates was going to grow at a rate equal to
30 percent of the annual flow of bachelor’s degrees
awarded and the "underemployment" share was go-
ing to rise 5.5 percentage points by the end of the
decade. The rise in the "underemployment" share was
instead only 1.7 percent. If the projections had been
correct, relative wages of college graduates should
have fallen; instead they rose by 23 to 26 percentage
points.
In reality, demand responds to supply and supply
responds, with a lag, to demand. An increase in the
supply of college graduates with computer science
degrees, for example, lowers wages for the group, and
this allows some companies to undertake projects not
feasible before and it induces other companies to keep
development work in the United States rather than
122 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewmoving it abroad. Wage rates and job-finding difficul-
ties influence enrolhnent decisions and choice of ma-
jor, so supply responds to demand. Getting "college-
level" jobs also depends on personal qualities--
initiative, work habits, and the like--of the graduates.
The BLS projection model has oscillated between
predicting large decreases and large increases in the
share of college graduates who are "underemployed"
because it omits feedback loops and other key deter-
minants of employment patterns. If one wants to
project shares of college graduates in "non-college"
jobs, a better approach is to estimate a historical model
(or system of equations) using variables that can be
forecasted h~to the future.
The evidence suggests that the BLS’s lnethods of
translating occupational projections into projections of
the demand-supply balance for college graduates are
seriously flawed. But the problelns are not limited to
the way in which occupational employment distribu-
tions are translated into numbers of college-level jobs.
The BLS’s occupational projections are also seriously
flawed. The BLS systematically under-projects the
growth of skilled jobs and over-projects the growth of
unskilled jobs.
Biases in BLS Projections of the Growth
of Managerial and Professional Jobs
A myth is abroad h~ the land that job growth is
coming (or will come) primarily from low-skill jobs
("McJobs"). In 1987, Levin and Rumberger, for exam-
ple, stated:
In summary, the evidence suggests that new tecln~ologies
are unlikely to have a profound effect in upgrading the
education and skill requirements of jobs, and that most
new jobs or job openings will be h~ occupations that
require relatively low skills and education (1987, p. 344).
In 1990, Mishel and Teixeira predicted:
Growth in skill levels from occupational upgrading will
actually slow down in the 1990s. In fact, future growth
rates in skill levels are likely to be only one-fourth to
one-third as fast as those h~ the recent past (1990, p. 1).
In 1995, Basil Whiting, a former deputy assistant
secretary in the Department of Labor, wrote:
Labor Department projections show that most new jobs
in the economy at the turn of the century will not be those
of technicians bnt rather in the more prosaic and lower-
paid fields of hospitality, retail sales, clerical work, jani-
toring and other service occupations (Whiting and Sayer
1995, p. 11).
All of these writers based their forecasts on BLS
occupational projections. Levin and Rumberger justi-
fied their reliance on BLS projections, as follows:
On the basis of their past record they are still likely to
provide a better indication of how the overall job market
will look in the future than generalizations from a few
casual observations, guesswork, or simple extrapolations
of past trends. The point is that none of the latter devices
has come close to the accuracy of the BLS forecasts iu a
world where--by their nature--no forecasts will be per-
fect (1987, p. 338).
How good is the past record of BLS projections of
job growth? BLS projected in 1981 that professional,
technical, and managerial jobs, which were 24.9 per-
cent of the nation’s jobs in 1978, would account for 28
percent of employment growth between 1978 and
1990 (see Table 5, line 3). Operatives, laborers, farm
laborers, and service workers, 37 percent of employ-
ment in 1978, had been projected to account for 35.4
percent of employment growth durh~g the period.
Columns 4 and 6 of Table 5 tell us what actually
happened: Professional, technical, and managerial
jobs accounted for 53.6 percent of 1978-90 job growth
and operative, laborer, and service jobs accotmted for
only 8.7 percent of the growth.
The passage of time has produced two additional
opportunities to compare projected growth to actual
growth: BLS’s 1983 and 1985 projections of occupa-
tional employment growth through 1995. BLS pro-
jected in 1983 that professional, technical, and mana-
gerial jobs (PT&M) would account for 30.7 percent of
job growth from 1982 to 1995. In fact, PT&M jobs
accounted for 53 percent of employment growth.
Operative, laborer, and service jobs (OL&S) were
projected to account for 30.8 percent of job growth, but
h~ reality accounted for only 15.7 percent of job
growth.
For the 1984 to 1995 period, BLS projected that
PT&M employment would account for 38.8 percent of
employment growth and that OL&S would account
for 28.7 percent of growth. Here again, they were far
off the mark. For the 1984 to 1995 period, PT&M
accounted for 58.3 percent of job growth, and OL&S
accounted for 15.9 percent (row 5 of Table 5). Figure 3
presents a comparison of projected and actual growth
by broad occupational category (rather than occupa-
tional shares of total growth, as in Table 5) for the
1984-95 period. As before, modest growth (22 percent
over 11 years) was projected for professional and
managerial jobs. Actual growth rates were much larg-
er: 35 percent for professional jobs and 51 percent for
managerial jobs. The BLS projection for technical jobs
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Grozoth Shares of High-Skill and Low-Skill Jobs:
Projections Compared to Subsequent Changes
Percent Professional- Percent Operative-
When Projection Technical-Managerial Laborer-Service
Published Period Projected    Actual Projected Actual





1. 1969 28.9 23.1
2. 1971 28.4 20.1
Bureau of Labor Statistics Revised Projection Method
3. 1981 1978-90 28.0 53.6 35.4 8.7
4. 1983 1982-95 30.7 53.0 30.8 15.7
5. 1985 1984-95 38.8 58.3 28.7 15.9
6. 1987 1986-2000 37.9 63.7* 27.8 15.7"
7. 1989 1988-2000 40.8 70.1" 24.6 11.0"
8. 1991 1990-2005 40.9 74.2* 27.1 10.5"
9. 1993 1992-2005 40.6 58.1" 31.6 16.2"
10. 1995 1994-2005 45.9 -- 30.2 --
Bishop/Carter Logit Regressions--1990-2000
11. Model: Time-Unemp-Trade-
PCShare 69.8 74.2* 1.9 10.5"
Bishop Linear Regressions--1990-2005
12. M1--Time-Unemp-Trade-
PCShare 68.1 74.2* .3 10.5*
13. M2--Tirne-Unernp-Trade 57.2 74.2* 10.6 10.5*
14. M3~Tirne-Unernp. 52.5 74.2* 6.1 10.5"
15. Bishop---Table 6 Model--
1995-2005 61.4 -- 12.1 --
Source: The record of the 1960-75 and 1970-80 BLS projections of occupational shares and
actual outcomes is taken from Carey (1980) and Carey and Kasunic (1982). Later projections
come from Carey (1981); Silvestri, Lucasiewicz and Einstein (1983); Silvestd and Lucasiewicz
(1985, 1987, 1989, 1991); Silvestri (1993) and BLS (1996). They are based on Occupational
Employment Survey estimates of occupational shares in the initial year. CPS data on occupational
employment from January issues of Employment and Earnings and Klein (1984) are used to
estimate actual growth shares. Estimates of the level of high-skill employment are higher in CPS
data and this accounts for about 5 percentage points of the difference between projected and
actual growth shares. For projection periods ending after 1995, an "actual" growth share (indicated
by an as.terisk) is reported for the shorter pedod from the baseline year up to August 1995. The Iogit
regression model is from Bishop and Carter 1991b, Table 2. The linear regression predictions of
employment growth are from Bishop (1992b). The projection in the bottom row uses the
regressions in Table 6 and assumes that in 2005 the unemployment rate is 5.5 percent, the trade
deficit equals 1.4 percent of GDP, and PC use is 80 percent above its 1990 value.
matched the actual growth of 29 percent, however. For
the operative, laborer, and service categories, each
component was overestimated.
Why Have BLS Projections Been
So Far Off the Mark?
value-added shares. For example,
unanticipated changes in the fed-
eral deficit and exchange rates
made export and import shares
of industry output particularly dif-
ficult to predict in the 1980s. Indus-
try-specific productixdty growth may
also be in error, resulting in incor-
rect predictions of industry em-
ployment.
Substantial changes also have
occurred in the occupational com-
position of specific industries, and
this has often been a major source
of error in occupational projec-
tions. BLS derives occupational
employment demand by multiply-
ing projected industry employ-
ment totals by an assumed, in-
dustry-specific, occupational share
vector. Adjustments are made to
these vectors when BLS studies of
the introduction of new technology
indicate that changes can be antic-
ipated by the end of the forecast
period.4 Since studies cannot be
funded for every industry and for
every technological innovation,
and the effects of these changes are
difficult to foresee 10 years in ad-
vance, many of the changes that
will occur in the composition of
occupational demand within in-
dustries are missed by BLS projec-
tions.
The BLS obtah~s its estimates
of the occupational composifion of
employment in specific industries
from a survey of establishments,
the Occupational Employment Sta-
tistics (OES). When the BLS made
the projections of 1990 occupational employment h~
1981, only one wave of OES survey data was available
for most states and industries. The projections for the
1984-95 period were made more difficult by a 1982-83
change in the occupational classification system. Com-
parability over thne is also threatened by the periodic
BLS occupational projections contain many pos-
sible sources of error. Projections of final demand
shares may be ~vrong. The input-output matrix is often
quite old, and this contributes to errors in projecth~g
4 This characterization of ho;v occupational staffing patterns
were projected is based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook
of Methods, Bulletin 2134-1, 1982, p. 143, and conversations with Ron
Kutscher, Associate Commissioner responsible for projections.
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changes in the industry-specific list of occupations
that respondents receive on their questiormaire. The
Handbook of Methods describes what is done when data
are thought to be of doubtful comparability: "When
an occupation is added, deleted or changed in defini-
tion from one OES survey to the next, extrapolated
trends are not developed: the current-year ratios for
these occupations are held constant in the preliminary
projected matrix" (BLS 1982, p. 143).
Given these data problems and BLS’s focus on
projecting over 500 different occupations, it is easy to
see why BLS chose not to systematically extrapolate
past trends in occupational staffing ratios derived
from OES or other data into the future, but rather to
rely on the judgment of analysts who can take data
quality problems into account. Systems that rely on
the judgment of analysts are inherently conservative,
however. Unfortunately, occupational staffing ratios
are seldom stable over periods of’10 years or more,
and it is better to start with an assumption that trends
are stable than that the ratios themselves are stable.
It does not appear that problems in extrapolath~g
changes in occupational staffing ratios have become
less serious as experience with the OES survey has
accumulated. The PT&M share of projected job
gro~vth has not increased much in later projections,
and the 1987 and 1989 projections seem as wide of the
mark as the 1985 projection (Table 5). With 64 percent
of the projection period already completed, the actual
PT&M share of job growth is running 25.8 percentage
points above the share projected in 1987. With 58
percent of the projection period already completed,
the actual PT&M sliare is running 29.3 percentage
points above the share projected in 1989.
Can Other Projection Methods Succeed
Where the BLS Method Has Failed?
Ron Kutscher, the Associate Commissioner at BLS
responsible for projections, has said "One could never
hope that a projection of the future is entirely accu-
rate" (1991, p. 253). A natural response to the criti-
cisms of BLS methods is to ask, "Can one do better?"
Shani Carter and I attempted to do better in a 1991
paper. We showed that both a simple linear extrapo-
lation of occupational share trends for the 1972-80
period and a regression-based projection did a better
job of predicting 1990 shares than the BLS (Bishop and
Carter 1991b).
Hindsight is always better than foresight, how-
ever. A projection constructed by someone with
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knowledge of the actual outcome will generally be
better than projections developed without such
knowledge. Probably the only really fair test of the
validity of alternative forecasting methodologies is to
look back at projections published in the past and
compare results.
This section of the paper offers such a test. The
1991 regression-based projections of Bishop and
Carter are compared to the BLS projections published
in the same year.5 Summary results on the high-skill
and low-skill shares of projected and actual job
growth are presented ha rows 8 and 11 of Table 5.
Projected shares of job growth through 2000 will be
compared to shares of actual job growth through 1995.
Professional, tectmical, and managerial jobs actually
accounted for 74 percent of job growth between 1990
and 1995. Operatives, laborers, and service workers
accounted for 10.5 percent. Bishop and Carter’s (B&C)
projections clearly come closer to the 1990-95 reality
than the BLS projections. B&C projected a 70 percent
5 The regression equations used for this exercise are found in
Table B2 of Bishop and Carter (1991a).
PT&M share of job growth and a OL&S share of 2
percent. BLS by contrast projected a PT&M share of 41
percent (46 percent when translated into CPS data)
and an OL&S share of 27 percent.
In a paper published in early 1992, Bishop pre-
sented projections based on a variety of linear speci-
fications, rather than a logit specification (Bishop
1992b). Summary results for these projections are
shown in rows 12 through 14 of Table 5. These
projections also outperform the BLS projections. The
best of the projections for the professional, technical,
and managerial category have the same four variables
on the right-hand side as the preferred model of
Bishop and Carter (1991a). In this preferred model,
occupational shares are a function of a time trend, the
unemployment rate, the merchandise trade balance as
a share of GDP, and the share of workers with
computers on their desks.
Let us take a more disaggregated look at how the
projections are doing, one-third of the way through
the 15-year projection period. Which occupations were
accurately projected by both methodologies? Which
occupations surprised both B&C and BLS? Figure 4
126 May/June 1996 Nezo England Economic Reviewcompares actual growth during the 1990-95 period to
projected growth. (The 15-year projections were sized
to a five-year period by the simple expedient of
dividing percentage growth projections by 3.) Both
projections missed three important developments:
sharp slowdowns in the growth of craft jobs, clerical
jobs, and technical jobs. In areas of disagreement
about growth rates--for managers, professionals, op-
eratives and laborers, and service workers--the B&C
methodology produced more accurate predictions.
For a description of the B&C model and its stability,
see Box 2.
Are the Wage Premiums Paid for
Skill Continuing to Rise?
The wage differential between college graduates
and high school graduates grew more slowly after
the mid to late 1980s than it did in the preceding
decade. It still appears to be growing, however. In
Katz and Murphy’s (1990) data, the weekly wage
differential for workers with one to five years of work
experience stabilized at a high level beghn~ing around
1985, but the differential for workers of all other
experience levels continued to grow through 1990, the
latest year of their data series (Murphy and Welch
1993). In Mishel and Bernstein’s (1992) data, the dif-
ferential for workers of all experience levels rose 7.8
percent between 1987 and 1990 and then fell 2.9
percent in 1991. Figure 5 presents the most recent data
on the wage premium received by those with four or
more years of college. For males, the wage premium
rose from 57 percent in 1989 to 64 percent in 1992 and
71 percent in 1993. For females, the premium rose
from 63 percent in 1989 to 68 percent in both 1992 and
1993.
The 1991-92 recession caused many companies to
cut back their l~iring of college graduates. The unem-
ployment rate among managers and professionals, 2.0
percent in the fh’st quarter of 1989, rose to 3.5 percent
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May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 127Box 2: Bishop and Carter’s Model of Occupational Employment Growth
It is assumed that the growth of occupational
employment shares follows a logistic growth path.
B&C assumed that the logistic function had a
ceiling of 20 percent. The logit was assumed to have
a ceiling in order to build in a slowdown in the rate
of growth for three large, fast-growing occupa-
tions-managers, professionals, and sales workers.
The ceiling was set at 20 percent because that fit the
data slightly better than higher ceilings. In the
preferred model, the log of the ratio of the jth
occupation’s share of employment in year t to 0.2
minus that same occupational share, [Sjt/(.2 - Sit)],
is assumed to depend on the year (Tt), the unem-
ployment rate (Ut), and one or more structural
variables, (Xt), intended to capture the influence of
the economic changes that have occurred in the
1980s. The independent variables have been de-
fined relative to their projected value in the year
2005.
2) log[Sit/(.20 - Sit)] = a0 + a~(Tt - 2005) +
a2(Ut - .055) q- a3(Xt -- X2005) t = 1972 ... 1989
For the three smallest occupations, farm workers,
protective service workers, and private household
workers, Xt is a trend shift variable for the years
after 1980. For the other 10 occupations, the X
variables were the ratio of the merchandise trade
deficit to GNP (TRADEFt) and the ratio of personal
computers used in business to civilian employment
(PCUSEt).6 The advantage of deviating all indepen-
dent variables from their projected level in the year
2005 is that the intercept term, a0, then provides an
esfimate of the forecasted logit of 5 times the jth
occupation’s share of employment in the year 2005.7
Bishop and Carter’s regression model of employ-
ment growth was estimated on data on employ-
ment shares from 1972 to 1989 (Bishop and Carter
1991a). Most of the estimated parameters were
1994. This setback was not the beginning of a crash in
the market demand for college graduates; it was a
temporary effect of the recession. Blue-collar workers
were hurt much more by the recession than managers
and professionals. The unemployment rate of opera-
tives and laborers, which was 7.7 percent in the first
quarter of 1989, rose to 11.4 percent in July 1992 and
was still 9.0 percent during 1994. BLS data on median
~veekly earnings can also be brought to bear on the
6 The estimates of the number of PCs in use in business ~vere
made by Future Computing/Datapro Inc. and can be found in Table
1340 of The Statistical Abstract, p. 179. They are derived by cumu-
lating the numbers of machines sold. A very low scrap rate of 3.4 to
6 percent, depending on the year, was assumed. Where possible,
vendor reports were used to allocate sales of computers between
categories of end user--business, education, and home. Quite often,
however, rules of thumb were used to make these allocations.
Future Computing is no longer in business so more detailed
information on how the series was constructed and data for 1989 are
not available. CPS surveys in 1989 and 1993 provide data on the
proportion of workers who use computers at work (NCES 1993c, p.
434, and 1994, p. 439). The proportionate growth rate produced by
comparing the two surveys was applied to the 1989 value of the PC
use variable from Future Computing. Projections of PC use for
succeeding years were made by extrapolation. Projections ;vere
based on an assumption that the unemployment rate in 2005 would
be 5.5 percent and the merchandise trade deficit would be 1.4
percent of GDP.
issue of recent trends in wage premiums for skill.
Between the second quarter of 1991 and the second
quarter of 1995, the annual rate of increase of nominal
wages was 1.4 percent for operatives and laborers, 1.6
percent for service workers, 1.7 percent for craft work-
ers, 1.2 percent for clerical workers, 3.3 percent for
technicians, 2.9 percent for managers and 3.7 percent
for professionals. In summary, the very latest data on
trends in occupational wage differentials suggest that
skill differentials continue to widen.
The latest data on employment growth have
similar implications. Between October 1994 and Octo-
ber 1995, professional jobs grew by 753,000 and lnan-
agerial jobs by 837,000, while service jobs rose by only
31,000 and all other jobs declined by 346,000.
7 B&C estimated a number of alternative models in order to test
the sensitivity of results to changes in functional form and specifi-
cation and in the scenario projected for the year 2000. Such tests
were needed because only 18 years of data were available on which
to estimate the forecasting model, and theory did not yield only one
plausible specification. The results of some of these tests are detailed
in Bishop and Carter (1990). Wllile specification and scenario did
affect projected occupational shares, all of the specifications yielded
substantially larger increases in skilled jobs than the BLS projec-
tions. Other findings were robust with respect to specification and
scenario as well.
128 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewremarkably stable when six additional years were
added to the analysis.8 Coefficients on the time
trend hardly changed at all. All of the changes in
coefficients on unemployment and trade deficit
were within the estimated one-standard-error con-
fidence interval. The intercept coefficients changed
the most. The right-hand-side variables have been
defined in such a ~vay that the intercept term
provides an estimate of the projected occupational
share in the year 2005 under an assumption of 5.5
percent unemployment, a zero trade deficit, and an
80 percent higher share of workers using PCs than
in 1990. By comparing these intercept coefficients,
we can get a rough idea about how the new data
have changed the forecast for 2005. For some occu-
pafions--professionals, craft, transportation opera-
tives, protective service workers--the updated fore-
cast for 2005 is the same as the old forecast.
Compared to B&C’s 1991 forecast, the revised fore-
cast predicts more rapid growth for farm workers
(6.7 percent), factory operatives (9.6 percent), other
service workers (2.7 percent), and laborers (5.5
percent). The revised forecast predicts 3.8 percent
less gro;vth for managers, 4.9 percent less growth
for sales workers, and 3.3 percent less growth for
clerical workers.9
The updated regressions predict slower growth
for managerial and technical employment than the
1991 B&C regressions and faster growth of opera-
tives, laborers, and service workers. This means
that instead of predicting that PT&M will account
for 70 percent of employment growth to 2005, the
updated projections now forecast that PT&M will
account for 60 percent of job growth. The updated
model projects that the operative, laborer, and
service worker share of 1990-2005 job growth will
be 12 percent, up from the 2 percent of the 1991
projection. The new estimates imply a slower rise
in skills than before, but they still imply a faster
rise in skills than BLS projections. Predictions of
the growth of professional jobs are now compar-
able with BLS’s 1993 and 1995 projections. For
managerial jobs, however, there is a big difference.
The updated projections of managerial job growth
are about 4.5 million greater than BLS’s 1993 pro-
jection.
Is the Supply Response Large Enough to
Flood the Market with New BAs?
The one event that could invalidate my prediction
of continued high wage premiums for college gradu-
ates is a massive increase in the number of college
graduates trained in well-paid fields like science,
engineering, and business. How likely is such a flood?
The high economic payoffs to college during the
late 1980s and the 1990s have increased enrolhnent in
college and the proportion of high school graduates
who complete at least one year of college (Figure 6).
Non-completion rates have remained high, however,
so enrolhnent increases during the 1980s have had
only a modest effect on the share of 25- to 29-year-old
high school graduates who have completed a four-
year degree or more. Many adults have gone back to
school and completed their degree, however, and this
has resulted in a substantial increase in the ratio of
BAs awarded to the number of 22-year-olds--from
22.5 percent in 1980 to 31.0 percent in 1992 (Figure 7).
This ratio is projected to increase further to 35.3
The estimates are available from the author upon request.
percent in the year 2000, a 57 percent increase over
1980 (NCES January 1995b).
The proportionate increase in the total number of
BAs awarded, however, is much smaller because the
low birth rates of the 1960s and ’70s mean that fewer
individuals are in the 20- to 30-year-old age cohort
that typically receives most of the BAs. As a result, the
9 The addition of 1990-95 data significantly changed the pro-
jections of employment in 2005 for tl~ree key occnpations. Manage-
rial Workers: In the 1991 paper the growing use of PCs appeared to
be the primary explanation of the accelerating growth of managerial
jobs during the 1980s. Despite the continued rise in PC use, the
recession of the early 1990s caused a larger than expected slowdown
in the growth of managerial jobs. B&C forecasts overpredicted
managerial jobs by 2 to 4 percent between 1990 and 1993 but then
got back on track when unemployment fell to 5.5 percent in 1994
and 1995. The updated estimate of the model gives unemployrnent
a more important role and PC use a less important role in the
determination of managerial jobs. Clerical Workers: The 1991 B&C
model overpredicted the growth of clerical jobs in the early 1990s,
underestimating the negative effect of the PC revolntion. The
updated regression reflects this by giving PC use a bigger role in the
determination of clerical employment. Facto~jl Operatives: In the 1991
B&C model PC use had a large, statistically significant, negative
effect on operative employment. Operative jobs did not decline
nearly as ranch as the model predicted, so the updated regression
model assigns less weight to PC use and the result is an increase in
projected employment of factory operatives.
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 129number of BAs awarded as a percentage of total
employment fell from 1.09 percent in 1974 to 0.95
percent in 1980 and 0.96 percent in 1992. It is projected
to fall even further, to 0.88 percent in 2000 and 0.86
percent in 2005. Relative to the stock of college grad-
uates, the number of new BAs has declined even more
precipitously. Thus, despite the technology-driven
shift in employer demand in favor of college-educated
workers, the ratio of new graduates to total employ-
ment has not risen.
To make matters worse, the number of college
graduates retiring from the labor force is increasing
every year, as the veterans who went to college under
the GI bill retire from the work force. As a result, the
ratio of workers with a college degree to those with
a high school degree or less is projected to grow no
more rapidly in the 1990s than it did during the 1980s
(Bishop 1992b, Table 4).
Is the Rapid Growth of College-Level
Jobs since 1970 an Aberration?
Still another way to test the reasonableness of our
projections of continued strong growth of demand for
college graduates is to look at trends in managerial
and professional jobs abroad and in the supply of
well-educated workers in other industrialized nations.
Let us define the rate of increase in skills as the
difference between the growth rate of professional,
technical, and managerial (PT&M) jobs and the
growth rate of manual jobs (service, craft, operative,
laborer, and farm occupations). For the United States,
the rate of skill increase was 1.6 percent per year
during the first half of the twentieth century, 1.9
percent per year between 1950 and 1970, 2.8 percent
per year between 1970 and 1981 and 2.5 percent per
year during the 1980s.
The rise in skills is proceeding even more rapidly
in Europe and East Asia (Table 6). The Japanese rate
was 4.3 percent per year in the 1970s and 3.3 percent
per year in the 1980s, the German rate ~vas 3.7 percent
per year in the 1970s and 2.5 percent in the 1980s.
Finland’s rate was 6.4 percent per year in the 1970s
and 5.1 percent per year in the 1980s, Korea’s 4.2
percent per year in the 1970s and 6.0 percent per year
in the 1980s. Three countries--Canada, Norway, and
the United Kingdom--now have proportionately more
professional, teclmical, and managerial workers than the
Ul~ited States, and other cotmtries are close belched.
The supply of college-educated workers has been
increasing rapidly all over the ~vorld. During the 1970s
Figure 6
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and 1980s, the share of the population of working age
who were university graduates grew at an annual rate
of 3.3 percent in the United States, 3.6 percent in Japan,
2.8 percent in Germany, 5.6 to 5.8 percent in Sweden
and Norway, 3.1 percent in Belgium and 4.0 percent in
Canada (OECD 1989).
The share of the work force that has graduated
from university is higher in the United States than
in any other country (columns 4 and 5 of Table 6).
But many Europeans would argue that the bachelor’s
degrees awarded at the second- and third-rank Amer-
ican colleges and universities that educate the vast
bulk of students reflect a lower standard than the
French licence or the Dutch Doctoraal examen. High
school graduation standards are also higher in Europe
and Asia. Completing secondary school requires 14
years rather than 13 years of attendance in some
countries. In others, high standards result in many
students having to repeat grades. In many cases, the
material Americans study in the freshman year of
college is taught to Asians and Europeans in second-
ary school.
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Any U.S. lead in the share of the work force with
college education is also a legacy of policy initiatives
that are 30 to 50 years old. The share of 25- to
29-year-olds who have graduated from college is no
l~igher now than it was 17 years ago. In terms of
flows--that is, numbers currently in school--the na-
tions of Northern Europe and East Asia ’have either
caught up or surged ahead. Using age-specific school
enrolhnent rates, the OECD has calculated the ex-
pected number of full-time equivalent years of school-
ing (K to 12 or post-secondary) received between ages
five and 29. These estimates are presented in the last
column of Table 6. For the United States, the figure is
14.8 years. The comparable figure is 15.9 in West
Germany and France, 15.8 in Belgium, 15.4 in Canada
and Finland, 15.6 in Norway and Denmark, and 16 in
the Netherlemds.
In sum, the rapid growth of college-trained work-
ers and of college-level jobs is not uniquely American.
American youth are neither more nor better educated
than their cmmterparts in Japan and Northern Europe.
Thus, the "America is so well educated, much of it
must be unnecessary" argument offered by Louis
Uchitelle and others is based on a premise that is no
longer valid, if it ever was.
Policy hnplications of These Findings
Professional, teclmical, managerial, and high-
level sales workers currently (October 1995) account
for 38.4 percent of United States employment, 42.2
percent of hours ~vorked, and about 59 percent of the
earnings received by all workers.~° By comparison,
craft workers, operatives, and laborers outside of
~o Employment and Earnings (November 1995, pp. 27, 34). High-
skill sales workers h~clude sales representatives outside of retail and
services and proprietors and supervisors in the retail and service
h~dustry. The median weekly wage for full-time managerial and
professional workers is 46 percent above the overall median.
High-skill sales workers’ wages are 30 percent above and techni-
cians’ wages 14 percent above the overall average. These ratios are
multiplied by the occupation’s share of hours worked to calculate
the share of earnings going to these high-skill occupations.
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Occupational Upskilling in OECD Countries
Annuai Rate by Which
Professional -Technical-
Managerial Grew More Rapidly Professional-Technical-
than Manual Workers Managerial
Share in 1990
1970-1981 b 1981-1990c (Percent)
Austria 2.3 2.0 24.0
Belgium 3.9 3.1 25.8
Canada 3.5 3.9 30.2
Denmark 6.6 2.5 28.0
Finland 6.4 5.1 28.6
France -- -- --
(West) Germany 3.7 2.5 19.9
Greece 6.1 3.8 14.3
Ireland 6.0 2.1 20.3
Japan 4.3 3.3 14.9
Korea 4.2 6.0 8.7
Malaysia -- 3.0 9.5
Netherlands 4.5 4.3 28.1
Norway 5.5 3.9 30.0
Singapore 3.8 4.8 20.3
Spain 3.3 5.9 12.8
Sweden 3.0 -- --
United Kingdomd 3.3 3.9 31.5
United Statese 2.8 2.5 29.3
Percent 25- to 64-Year
Oldsa in 1992 with
Years of School
NonUniv/ Expected at















aOECD, Education at a Glance, 1995, pp. 20, 127. The OECD calculates expected years in school by summing, from age 5 through age 29, age-specific
school or college attendance rates (full-time equivalents) taken from national census or household surveys. Since the calculation stads with age 5,
kindergarten and nursery school attendance is counted as a year in school.
bManual occupations include farming, fisheries, craft, operatives, laborers and service workers. Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics for 1971,1976, 1981
and 1991, International Labour Organization, Table 2B and Table 3C. Data availability problems resulted in somewhat different time periods being used
for Belgium--1970-83, Canada--1971-81, Denmark 1965-81, Greece--1961-81, Ireland--1966-83, Japan--1970-80, Germany--1970- 82, and
Netherlands--1971-81.
CSource: ILO, 7991 Handbook of Labour Statistics, Table 3. Absent data meant that shorter time periods were used for some countries: Austda 1984-89,
Belgium 1983-89, Federal Republic of Germany 1982-89, Greece 1981-88, Ireland 1983-88, and Malaysia 1981-87.
dGrowth rates were calculated for 1971 to 1978 and 1978 to 1989. Source: MSC Manpower Report 1980, p. 8 and Labour Force Survey 1988 and 1989,
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Table 5.11.
eSource: Deborah Klein, "Occupational Employment Statistics for 1972-82," Employment and Earnings. Jan. 1984. 13-16; and later January issues of
Employment and Earnings. Because of a change in occupational coding in 1972, the trend was calculated for the 1972-81 period.
construction receive only about 19 percent of the
compensation paid in the economy. The competitive-
ness of the American ~vork force is in reality more a
ftmction of the cost and quality of managerial, profes-
sional, and technical workers than it is of the blue-
collar factory workers ~vho are normally the focus of
discussions of competitiveness.
The short-run consequence of a shortage of higttly
qualified workers is higher wage pren-dums for the
skilled. The long-run consequence may be loss of
comparative advantage in industries that make heavy
use of managerial, professional, and technical work-
ers. The high cost of hiring managerial and profes-
sional workers in the United States is already inducing
firms to look elsewhere for these skills. For example,
many software companies now economize on expen-
sive American programmers and systems analysts by
contracting with subsidiaries in Bulgaria, Russia, and
India to develop code for new programs.
In 1991, Hewlett-Packard picked a Frenchman to
head its troubled PC division and moved the divi-
sion’s headquarters to his home town of Grenoble,
France. Since then, HP has staged a dramatic come-
back in the PC market. Manufacturing time was cut,
pricing became more aggressive and, as a result, HP
moved from fourteenth to sixth largest PC producer in
the world. Production, which had been spread across
12 plants, was concentrated into just two, one of which
is in Grenoble (The Economist 1993). Hewlett-Packard
is not alone. In 1991 and 1992, Du Pont moved the
132 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewheadquarters of its electronics division to Tokyo and
its agricultural products division and part of its fiber
and polymer business to Switzerland. IBM moved its
networking systems division headquarters to the
United Kingdom (Lublin 1992). Is this the start of a
trend?
During the 1980s, 18- to 64-year-old college grad-
uates with a business major earned nearly three times
what high school graduates of the same gender earned
(Kominski and Sutterlin 1992). Since social rates of
return to college are now at postwar highs, substantial
increases in supply are desirable. This would simulta-
neously reduce the supply of unskilled workers, so
The competitiveness of the
American work force is in reality
more a function of the cost and
quality of managerial,
professional, and technical
workers than it is of the blue-
collar factory workers who are
normally the focus of discussions
of competitiveness.
skill premiums should fall and unskilled wages
should rise. It would not be a tragedy if a major
h~crease in college completion rates lowered the wage
premium paid business B.A.s over high school grad-
uates to only 100 percent rather than 200 percent.
Indeed, competitiveness would improve and income
inequality would decline.
Substantial increases have already occurred in the
proportion of young people getting college degrees,
but these have not been sufficient to stop the seem-
ingly inexorable rise iu the college wage premium.
Still bigger increases in college enrollments have been
prevented by a rapid escalation of tuition charges at
public colleges and the limited availability of need-
based financial aid (Bishop 1992a). Durh~g the 1980s,
tuition charges rose 48 percent more than student
ability to pay out of current earnings.
Legislators and college presidents often justify the
escalation of college tuition as only fair, given the high
wages graduates receive as adults. Setting tuition high
is claimed to be a way of helping those who cannot
afford college at the expense of rich college graduates.
This is a myth. The promised increases in financial
aid are never sufficient to hold college students
from low-income families harmless. The primary out-
comes are fewer students, fewer graduates, and higher
wages for those who complete college. College enroll-
ment and graduation rates are highly responsive to
tuition levels. Regression models (Bishop 1992a) imply
that raising public college tuition by 50 percent ($893
per year) would lower the enrollment of 18- to 19-
year-old women by 16 percent, lower the enrolhnent
of 20- to 24-year-old women by 21 percent, and lower
the number of B.A.s awarded to women by 11.8
percent.~
Elasticities of demand for and supply of college
graduates are such that a 12 percent reduction in the
supply of college graduates increases their wage rela-
tive to that of l~igh school graduates by about 5.8
percent, or $1886 per year in 1992 dollars.~ In the new
long-run equilibrium that results, the present dis-
~ Average public college tuition charges were $1787 in 1992-93
(NCES 1993c, p. 309). A regression predicting the ratio of BAs
awarded to women divided by the mean number of high school
diplomas received by womeu 4 to 10 years previously was used to
predict the impact of a 50 percent increase in public college tuition
from its 1988 level (Bishop 1991). The ratio of tuition to the forgone
earnings of female college students (the wage of female high school
gradnates with 1 to 5 years of work experience times .75) was
assumed to be .1355, its actual level iu 1988. The higher tuition
policy is assumed to increase this permanently to .20325. The
proportionate change in BA awards was calculated by multiplying
(.20325 - .1355) × (the coefficient on the tuition variable) × (1 minus
the ratio of BAs to high school diplomas in 1989) = (.06775) ×
(-2.72) × (1 - .362) = 11.75 percent.
~ The relative supply of college graduates is defined as In-
[(BAs/HSG)/(1 - BAs/HSG)] = In[BAs/(HSG - BAs)] = E~. The
effect of the 50 percent hacrease in tuition on E~, TP, is -.1843 =
.06775 × (-2.72). Using a logarithmic approximation of the model
predicting E~ in Bishop (1991), we have a formula for the relative
supply curve: E~ = .89 × ln(Wc~/WHsc)/.75 + TP + S, where S
captures the effect on supply of other exogenons variables. Follow-
ing Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1989), I assume an elasticity of
relative demand of -2, so the relative demand curve is Ed = --2.0 ×
ln(Wc~/WHs~) + D, where D is a variable reflecting other influ-
ences on relative demand for college ~aduates. Setting Ed = Es, and
reorganizing terms to get an expression for tbe relative wage, we
have hI(WcG/WHsG) = (TP + S - D)/(-2.0 - .89/.75) = (TP + S -
D)/3.19. The long-run ilnpact of the tuition increase on relative
wages is (-.18428)/(3.19) = .0578 or 6 percent. If the elasticity of
relative demand bad been assumed to be -4, the equilibrium
increase in relative wages would have been 3.55 percent. Even with
this very high elasticity of substitution, the long-run effect of a high
tuition policy is to help college graduates and hurt those who do not
go to college. Since a 12 percent change in the flow of new BAs takes
many years to have comparable effects on the stock of BAs,
short-run effects on relative wages would be small, so when the
policy is introduced the first fe~v cohorts of college graduates lose
out initially, because the wage increase starts out being small: After
eight years or so, however, college graduates benefit from the policy
change.
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 133counted value of after-tax earnings over the conrse of
the graduate’s career goes np $23,100, much more
than the $3574 of additional tuition payments.13 Those
who graduate from college gah~ from a high-tuition
policy. Two groups lose: those who are prevented
from attending and graduating from college and those
who never planned to go to college in the first place.
They suffer a decline in their real wage because the
la I seek to calculate the long-run impact of the policy of raising
public college tuition charges by 50 percent and keeping them high.
Mean earnings of college graduates were $32,629 in 1992, so a 5.8
percent increase is $1886 per year. The marginal tax rate (netting out
deductions) on these earnings is assumed to be 35 percent, so at a 5
percent real rate of discount, the PDV at age 21 is $1886. × .65 ×
17.89 = $21,931 where 17.89 ~ (1/.05)(I - e~S9 because the
individual is assumed to work continuously until age 66.
number of high school graduates competing for the
limited number of low- and medium-skilled jobs has
gone up.
The implication of this discussion is that low
tuition levels in public colleges (and tax deductions
for college tuition) are both an effective and a fair way
of increasing the supply of college graduates. Other
ways of increasing the supply of college graduates
are expanded financial aid; higher academic standards
in high school, to reduce college drop-out rates; ex-
pansion of advanced placement programs, so as to
shorten the time required to earn a degree; and
preference for immigrants with high-level scientific
and technical trainh~g over immigrants with little
education and few skills.
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I
agree with the basic argument of John Bishop’s
paper, that college will continue to be a good
investment in the years to come. I would like to
address four questions raised by his paper. The first
three might be asked by readers of media reports
about hard times for college graduates. Many of these
reports, as Bishop points out, are based on projections
made by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. My
responses to the questions posed by hypothetical
readers are based on a paper that John Tyler, Frank
Levy, and I recently published. The questions are as
follows:
¯ Why are so many college graduates anxious
about their economic positions, given that they
are faring so much better than high school grad-
uates?
¯ Is there any group of college graduates whose
labor market experiences durh~g the 1980s fit the
gloomy prediction of the BLS?
¯ How can John Bishop’s optimistic picture of the
attractiveness of investing in college be recon-
ciled with everyone’s experience of knowing a
college graduate from the class of 1994 or 1995
who is working at a coffee bar?
¯ How can states most effectively help low-income
high school graduates pay for college?
Why Are Recent College Graduates
(Especially Males) Anxious?
The first line of Table 1 lists the median earnings
for 25- to 34-year-old male college graduates in the
years 1979, 1989, and 1993, all in 1993 dollars. The
second line lists comparable information for 25- to
34-year-old male high school graduates. The third line
lists the college graduate/high school graduate earn-
ings ratio, showing clearly the growth in the educa-
tion-related earnings premium. However, another
look at the top line sho~vs that the median earnings of
young male college graduates grew only 2 percent
between 1979 and 1989 and fell by 4 percent during
the subsequent four years.
As the figures in the second line make clear, the
education-related earnings differential rose because of
the dramatic decline in the earnings of high school
graduates. The median income of 25- to 34-year-old
high school graduates in 1993 was $20,000; this is less
than three-fourths of the median earnings (in 1993
dollars) for the comparable group in 1979. Thus, while
young college graduates are certainly better off rela-
tive to high school graduates today than was the case
in 1979, young male college graduates do not have
significantly higher incomes today than their counter-
parts did 15 years ago. This is one factor that contrib-
utes to their anxiety. Another is that most have larger
college debt burdens than did their counterparts 15
years ago. This is a consequence of the rapid tuition
increases, particularly at public colleges, that Bishop
describes in his paper.
Is There Any Group of College Graduates
Whose Labor Market Experiences Fit the
Stories of the Media Jeremiads?
Table 2 lists two indicators of economic well-
being in 1979 and 1989 for four groups of college
graduates: 25- to 34-year-old women, 25- to 34-year-
old males, 45- to 54-year-old women, and 45- to 54-
year-old males. The two indicators are median earn-
ings (in 1993 dollars) and the percentage of the group
holding jobs classified as "high school jobs" by econ-
omists at the BLS. As the numbers make clear, young
Table 1
Median Earnings of 25- to 34-Year-Old
Males and Females, in 1993 Dollars
1979     1989     1993
Males    College Graduates $31,579 $32,336 $31,000
High School
Graduates $27,427 $22,791 $20,000
Earnings Ratio:
Coll. Grad/
H.S. Grad 1.15 1.42 1.55
Females College Graduates $19,593 $24,252 $24,340
High School
Graduates $13,719 $13,858 $14,000
Earnings Ratio:
Coll. Grad/
H.S. Grad 1.43 1.75 1.74
Source: The 1979 and 1989 earnings figures were calculated from the
1980 and 1990 Public Use Microdata 1 Percent Samples of the U.S.
Census of Population and Housing. The 1993 earnings figures were
calculated from the March 1994 Current Population Survey.
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Indicators of Economic Well-Being in 1979
and 1989 for Four Groups of Four-Year
College Graduates
Percent
Cohort 1979 1989 Change
Young Women (25 to 34)
Median Earnings (1993 $) $19,593 $24,252 23.8
Percent in Jobs Requiring
High School Education 28.2 25.2 -3.0a
Young Men (25 to 34)
Median Earnings $31,579 $32,336 2.4
Percent in Jobs Requiring
High School Education 25.0 23.2 -1.8a
Older Women (45 to 54)
Median Earnings $21,552 $26,56I 23.2
Percent in Jobs Requiring
High School Education 27.6 23.6 -4.0a
Older Men (45 to 54)
Median Earnings $52,886 $50,814 -4.1
Percent in Jobs Requiring
School Education 14.5 17.9 3.4a
~ln percentage points.
Note: Data are for college graduates who worked at least one week during
1979 or 1989. All statistics reported in this table were calculated from the
1980 and 1990 Public Use Microdata 1 Percent Samples of the U.S.
Census of Population and Housing.
from the ages of 22 to 30, in 1989 and in 1993. The very
low median earnings for college graduates at age 22
and 23 are consistent with everyone’s anecdotes about
college graduates working in coffee bars. But the
earnings at age 30 are consistent with the earnings
figures reported earlier. So the story is that it does take
many college graduates a couple of years to find their
way into jobs that have career potential. But it does
The deterioration in the earnings
of male high school graduates that
took place during the 1980s has
continued into the 1990s.
happen. Moreover, it happened in 1993 as well as in
1989. In fact, the projected earnings profiles for college
graduates in the two years are remarkably similar.
In contrast, the charted earnings profiles for male
l~gh school graduates are much more shallo~v, illus-
trating that not only do they have low earnings at age
women improved their position over the decade of the
1980s; young men held their own; older women im-
proved their position. The one group in a worse
average economic position in 1989 than the compara-
ble group in 1979 is the 45- to 54-year-old men. As
Bishop explains in his paper, there are reasons to be
cautious in interpreting changes over time in the
percentage of a group employed in what the BLS
refers to as "high school jobs." But the decline over the
1980s in the median real earnings of older male college
graduates is unequivocal. The difference between the
declining economic position during the 1980s of older
men and the stable or improving position for other
groups of college graduates is missing from most BLS
studies, because they tend to group all college gradu-
ates together in their analyses.
What about the College Graduates
Working in Coffee Bars?
Figure 1 displays the median earnings of male
high school graduates and male college graduates
Figure 1
"Coffee Bars Story" for Males
High School vs. College Graduates, 1989 and 1993
Median Earnings in
Thousands of 1993 Dollars
35
30 ~ College M~
~igh School Males ’93
10 ~College Males ’93 ~
5
22 24 26 28 30
Age
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 13722, they also have quite low earnings at age 30. Note
also that at each age level, the median earnings of male
high school graduates are lower in 1993 than in 1989,
illustrating that the deterioration in the earnings of
male high school gradttates that took place during the
1980s has continued into the 1990s.
How Can States Most Effectively
Help Low-Income High School
Graduates Pay for College?
In closing, I would like to comment on Bishop’s
argument that the escalation of tuitions at public
colleges and universities should stop because it is
keeping many students from college, especially stu-
dents from low-income families, who could benefit
from this investment. I share his concern with the
problem. However, I wonder whether a better re-
sponse than argtting for tuition rollbacks might not be
found. Currently, the states contribute about $40 bil-
lion to public post-secondary education. Over 90 per-
cent is used to subsidize tuition rates. Given the fiscal
situations in most states, this amount is unlikely to
increase over the coming years, which means that it
will be difficult even to maintain current tuition levels,
never mind reduce them.
It seems to me that a better policy would be to
allow tuitions to increase and use a significant part
of the increased revenue for need-based financial aid,
targeted to low-income students, whose enrolhnent
decisions are especially sensitive to costs. This will
work only if the availability of such aid is well
publicized, and if significant steps are taken to sim-
plify the application process for student aid. But these
steps seem manageable, and targeting more of state
financial assistance to low-income students seems
important to do, given the tight fiscal situation.
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